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Abstract
Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options
are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a distributed way. The
more popular an option is, the more likely it is to be chosen by uncommitted players. Uncommitted players can be attracted
by those committed to any of the other two options through a cross-inhibitory signal. This model originates in the context
of honeybees swarms, and we generalize it to duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. The contributions of this work
include (1) the formulation of an evolutionary game model to explain the behavioral traits of the honeybees, (2) the study of
the individuals and collective behavior including equilibrium points and stability, (3) the extension of the results to the case
of structured environment via complex network theory, (4) the analysis of the impact of the connectivity on consensus, and
(5) the study of absolute stability for the collective system under time-varying and uncertain cross-inhibitory parameter.
Key words: Game Theory; Consensus; Multi-Agent Systems.
1 Introduction
We consider a large population of players who can choose
option 1, option 2 or no option (uncommitted state).
The two options are equally favorable and the population
has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly
and in a distributed way. Players i) benefit from choos-
ing the more popular option, ii) they can recruit uncom-
mitted players, and iii) they can send cross-inhibitory
signals to players committed to a different option.
Highlights of contributions. First, we provide an in-
terpretation as game dynamics by modelling the evolu-
tion of the frequency of each strategy. We also introduce
a new notion of game dynamics, which we call expected
gain pairwise comparison, according to which the play-
ers change strategy with a probability that is propor-
tional to the expected gain. We also extend the model
to duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics. A sec-
ond contribution is the analysis of stability of the indi-
⋆ A short version of this work has appeared as invited paper
in Stella and Bauso (2017).
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viduals behaviors. Our analysis shows that, if the cross-
inhibitory parameter exceeds a threshold, which we cal-
culate explicitly, players reach consensus on one of the
two options. Otherwise they distribute uniformly across
the two options at the equilibrium. As third contribu-
tion, we reframe the above results in the case of struc-
tured environment. The structure of the environment is
captured by a complex network, with given degree dis-
tribution. The nodes are the players and the degree of a
node represents its connectivity. This allows us to study
the role of heterogeneity. The following is a list of addi-
tional results with respect to the conference paper, see
Stella and Bauso (2017). First, we provide a convergence
analysis as a function of the connectivity. Then, we prove
that higher connectivity increases the number of uncom-
mitted players. Last, we prove absolute stability under
time-varying uncertain cross-inhibitory parameter.
Related literature. The proposed model originates in
the context of a swarm of honeybees, see Britton et al.
(2002), and Pais et al. (2013). The analogy with
duopolistic competition in marketing has been inspired
by Bressan (2010), and the link to opinion dynamics
in social networks by Hegselmann and Krause (2002).
Although the role of cross-inhibitory parameter was
studied in Pais et al. (2013), here we stress a different
Preprint submitted to Automatica 11 November 2018
perspective based on the Lyapunov’s direct method
for stability analysis and control design. Evolution-
ary dynamics in structured environment is discussed
in Tan et al. (2014), Piccardi and Casagrandi (2008),
Ranjbar-Sahraei et al. (2014). A game perspective in
collective decision making is provided in Salhab et al.
(2015). Consensus and games are studied in Yin et al.
(2012).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we de-
scribe the game. In Section 3, we discuss applications.
In Sections 4 and 5, we consider unstructured and struc-
tured environments, respectively. In Section 6, we study
the asymmetric case. In Section 7, we study absolute sta-
bility under uncertain and time-varying cross-inhibitory
signal. In Section 8, we provide numerical analysis. In
Section 9, we provide conclusions and future works.
2 Game Dynamics
Given a large population of players, each player chooses
within a set of three pure strategies. Let us denote the
frequency of strategy i, namely the portion of the pop-
ulation who has selected that strategy, by xi ∈ R+0 ,∑3
i=1 xi = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3. Let A = (aij) be the payoff
matrix defined as follows:
A =


r1 −σ2 0
−σ1 r2 0
0 0 0

 . (1)
The non-zero entries of matrix A simulate a coordina-
tion game, whereby the row player benefits from match-
ing the column player’s strategy. The row player earns
r1 and r2 dollars for matching strategy 1 or 2, other-
wise he loses σ1 or σ2 if playing strategy 2 or 1 while
the column player plays the other strategy. Uncommit-
ted players do not gain nor loose anything in random-
matching with opponents. The above matrix models a
crowd-seeking scenario where the benefit of choosing a
strategy between 1 and 2 depends on the frequency of
that strategy. In addition, before choosing strategy 1 or
2, players must be in an uncommitted state, namely in
strategy 3. The evolution of the frequencies of each strat-
egy is in accordance with the following game dynamics
which links to the notion of innovative dynamics as in
Hofbauer (2011). Let ρij be the transition rate from i
to j:
x˙i =
∑
j
xjρji − xi
∑
j
ρij . (2)
The following is the definition of expected gain compar-
ison given x for our game dynamics, which constitutes
the first contribution of this paper.
Definition 1 (Expected gain comparison) Given a
payoff matrix A = (aij) ∈ Rn×n, by changing from strat-
egy j to i the expected gain pairwise payoff comparison is
defined as
Eji(x) =
n∑
k=1
(aik − ajk)+xk + bji, (3)
where (aik − ajk)+ denotes the positive part of aik− ajk,
and bji is an offset.
The above definition models the expected revenue ob-
tained by considering the probability only of a payoff in-
crease and ignoring payoff decreases in correspondence
to a unilateral change of strategy.
For the payoff matrix in (1), we then have ρ31 = r1x1 +
γ1, ρ13 = σ2x2+α1, ρ32 = r2x2+γ2 and ρ23 = σ1x1+α2,
where the offset bij is γ1, γ2, α1 or α2 in each specific
case. By substituting the previous equations in dynam-
ics (2) and using the conservation of mass law, for which
it holds x˙3 = −x˙1 − x˙2, the formulation of the system
can be reduced to a two-dimensional system as follows:
Unstructured
{
x˙1 = x3(rx1 + γ)− x1(α+ σx2),
x˙2 = x3(rx2 + γ)− x2(α+ σx1),
(4)
where we take α1 = α2 =: α, γ1 = γ2 =: γ and σ1 =
σ2 =: σ (symmetric case). The above system is obtained
in the case of unstructured environment, i.e., it does not
consider any interaction topology. Such a system, in the
asymmetric case, where the parameters are different for
the two options, admits theMarkov chain representation
displayed in Fig. 1.
3
1 2
γ1 + r1x1
α1 + σ2x2
γ2 + r2x2
α2 + σ1x1
Fig. 1. Markov chain relating to the game dynamics.
In the case of structured environment, let a complex
network be given where P (k) is the probability distri-
bution of the node degrees. Also let xki be the portion
of the population with k connections (class k in short)
using strategy i, and let ψk =
k
kmax
be the parameter
capturing the connections of the players in the network.
Furthermore, let 〈k〉 be the mean value of k, and let
θi :=
1
〈k〉
∑
k kP (k)x
k
i be the probability that a link ran-
domly chosen will point to a player using strategy i. The
counterpart of system (4) for every class k ∈ Z+ is:
Structured
{
x˙k1 = x
k
3(ψkrθ1 + γ)− xk1(α+ ψkσθk2 ),
x˙k2 = x
k
3(ψkrθ2 + γ)− xk2(α+ ψkσθ1).
(5)
2
We can view the above system as a microscopic model of
the players in class k parametrized by the macroscopic
parameters θ1 and θ2.
3 Examples
This section discusses three examples of applications
of the game model in (4), namely honeybees swarm,
duopolistic competition and opinion dynamics.
Swarm of honeybees. System (4) was first devel-
oped in the context of honeybees swarms, see Pais et al.
(2013). The swarm has to choose between two nest-
boxes. The two options have same value r1 = r2 =: r.
Scout bees recruit uncommitted bees via a “waggle
dance”. The parameters σ1 = σ2 =: σ weight the
strength of the cross-inhibitory signals. We can inter-
pret x1 as the portion of swarm selecting option 1, x2
the portion of swarm selecting 2 and x3 the portion of
swarm in the uncommitted state 3. Transitions from
option 3 to 1 involve a γ1 amount of independent bees
that choose 1 spontaneously and a quantity ρ1x1 of bees
attracted by those who are already in 1. On the other
hand, consider the case where bees move from strategy
1 to 3: α1 are those that spontaneously abandon their
commitment to strategy 1 and σ2x2 takes into account
the cross-inhibitory signal sent from bees using option 2.
Duopolistic competition in marketing. System (4)
provides an alternative model of duopolistic competi-
tion in marketing, see e.g. Example 9, p. 27 in Bressan
(2010). The classical scenario captured by the well-
known Lanchester model is as follows. Two manufac-
turers produce the same product in the same market.
The variables xi represent the market share of the man-
ufacturer i at time t. The cross-inhibitory signal and
the “waggle dance” term describe different advertising
efforts, which may enter the problem as parameters
or controlled inputs in the analysis or design of the
advertising campaign. Thus system (4), likewise the
Lanchester model, describes the evolution of the market
share. In the case of structured environment, system
(5) captures the social influence of the advertisement
campaigns of both manufacturers. A stronger cross-
inhibitory signal can be used to model the capability of
reaching out to a larger number of potential clients.
Opinion dynamics. Consider a population of individ-
uals, each of which can prefer to vote left or right, see
Hegselmann and Krause (2002). This is represented by
the Markov chain depicted in Fig. 1 where nodes 1 and
2 represent the left and right. The distribution of indi-
viduals in each state is subject to transitions from one
state to the other. Persuaders who campaign for the left
can influence the transitions from the right to the un-
committed state in a similar way honeybees use cross-
inhibitory signals. At the same time uncommitted indi-
viduals select left or right proportionally to the level of
popularity of the two options. In the case of structured
environment, system (5) captures the social influence of
each individual. In other words, the cross-inhibitory sig-
nal is stronger for those individuals who have more con-
nections.
4 Unstructured environment
In this section, we study stability under unstructured en-
vironment and symmetric cross-inhibitory parameters.
Theorem 1 Given T > 0 and an initial state x0, the
equilibrium points of game dynamics (4) are:
• Case 1. When x1 = x2,
x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) =
(
(r−2γ−α)+
√
(r−2γ−α)2+4γ(2r+σ)
2(2r+σ) ,
(r−2γ−α)+
√
(r−2γ−α)2+4γ(2r+σ)
2(2r+σ) ,
1− (r−2γ−α)+
√
(r−2γ−α)2+4γ(2r+σ)
2r+σ
)
.
• Case 2. When x3 = α/r,
x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) =
(
1−α
r
±
√
(1−α
r
)2+ 4αγ
σr
2 ,
1− 1−αr ±
√
(1−α
r
)2+ 4αγ
σr
2 − αr , αr
)
.
• Case 3. When x1 = x2 and x3 = α/r,
x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) =
(√
αγ
rσ ,
√
αγ
rσ ,
α
r
)
=
(
r−α
2r ,
r−α
2r ,
α
r
)
.
Cases 1 and 3 refer to equilibrium points that are sym-
metric, i.e. we have the same number of individuals com-
mitted to option 1 and 2.
Corollary 1 Let α → 0, the equilibria converge to
(1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) inCase 2 and to (12 ,
1
2 , 0) inCase 3.
Note that the equilibrium points (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0)
correspond to consensus to option 1 and 2 respectively,
while (12 ,
1
2 , 0) means that players are uniformly dis-
tributed between the two options. These results will be
used in the following sections, when we will consider a
time-varying cross-inhibitory signal σ(t), which is one
of the novelties of this work. The next result establishes
local asymptotic stability of the symmetric equilibrium
described in Case 1.
Theorem 2 Given T > 0 and an initial state x0, the
symmetric equilibrium point in Case 1 is locally asymp-
totically stable if and only if
σ <
4rαγ
(r − α)2 . (6)
3
Remark 1 In the special case where α = 1r and γ = r
our results are in accordance with the threshold value
reported in equation (4) in Pais et al. (2013).
5 Structured environment
In this section we extend to the case of structured envi-
ronment the results on equilibrium points and stability
provided in the previous section. Let us consider game
dynamics (5) and analyze the mean-field response ob-
tained for a given class of players assuming that the dis-
tribution of the rest of the population is fixed. From
xk1 + x
k
2 + x
k
3 = 1, game dynamics (5) becomes
x˙k1 = (1 − xk1 − xk2)(ψkrθ1 + γ)− xk1(α + ψkσθ2),
x˙k2 = (1 − xk1 − xk2)(ψkrθ2 + γ)− xk2(α + ψkσθ2).
(7)
We can rewrite the above system in matrix form and,
under the assumption that θ1 = θ2 =: θ, we have
[
x˙k1
x˙k2
]
=
Ak(θ)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
−(r + σ)ψkθ − α− γ −ψkrθ − γ
−ψkrθ − γ −(r + σ)ψkθ − α− γ
]
·
[
xk1
xk2
]
+
[
ψkrθ + γ
ψkrθ + γ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ck(θ)
.
(8)
Theorem 3 Given T > 0 and an initial state xk0 , for
all classes k, system (8) is locally asymptotically stable
and convergence is faster with increasing connectivity ψk.
Furthermore, in the cases of no connectivity ψk = 0 and
full connectivity ψk = 1, system (8) has eigenvalues
λ1,2 =
{
(−α− 2γ,−α), for ψk = 0,
(−(2r + σ)θ − α− 2γ,−σθ − α), for ψk = 1.
From Fig. 2, we can see that the connectivity shifts the
eigenvalue further away from the origin (the ones for the
first case are labelled above the x-axis, while the ones
for the second case are below). Thus, higher connectivity
speeds up convergence.
Theorem 4 Let T > 0 and an initial state xk0 , for
class k, the equilibrium points are[
xˆk1
xˆk2
]
= −A−1k (θ)ck(θ). (9)
Furthermore, at the equilibrium, the distribution x3 of
uncommitted players increases with connectivity ψk.
Re{λ}
Im{λ}
−α− 2γ −α
−α− 2γ − (2r + σ)θ −α− σθ
Fig. 2. Change of the eigenvalues for system (8).
Remark 2 The physical interpretation of the above re-
sult is that by increasing the connectivity of the network
we bring more uncertainty into the collective decision
making process. This reflects in an increase of the per-
centage of uncommitted players at steady-state.
Let us now develop a model combining a macroscopic
and microscopic dynamics. By averaging on both sides
of (8) using 1〈k〉
∑
k kP (k) we have the following macro-
scopic model:


θ˙1 =
rθ1
kmax
(
V (k)
〈k〉 −Ψ1 −Ψ2
)
− σθ2kmaxΨ1
−θ1α+ γ − θ1γ − θ2γ,
θ˙2 =
rθ2
kmax
(V (k)/〈k〉 −Ψ1 −Ψ2)− σθ1kmaxΨ2
−θ2α+ γ − θ1γ − θ2γ,
(10)
where V (k) =
∑
k k
2P (k)xk and Ψ = 1〈k〉
∑
k k
2P (k)xk.
Theorem 5 Given T > 0 and an initial state x0, the
symmetric equilibrium point in the case of structured en-
vironment is locally asymptotically stable if and only if
σ < 2r − rV (k)〈k〉Ψ +
αkmax
Ψ
. (11)
The above threshold for the cross-inhibitory signal gen-
eralizes (6) in the case of structured environment. When
k = kmax, i.e. in the case of fully connected network, the
threshold in (11) coincides with (6).
6 The asymmetric case
In the asymmetric case we consider only the cross-
inhibitory signal sent from players in 1 to players in 2
and the spontaneous migration from 3 to 1 and 2 with
rate γ1 and γ2 respectively. The resulting model is
x˙1 = γ1x3,
x˙2 = −σx2x1 + γ2x3,
x˙3 = −γ1x3 − γ2x3 + σx2x1.
(12)
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The above dynamics share striking similarities with the
susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model. Actually, x1,
x2 and x3 can be viewed as the percentage of suscepti-
ble, infected and recovered agents, respectively. Param-
eter γ1 is the rate at which individuals decay into the
recovered class and parameter σ is the rate at which the
infection is spread among the population. The counter-
part of (12) in the case of heterogeneous connectivity is
x˙k1 = γ1x3,
x˙k2 = −σψkxk2Θ1 + γ2x3,
x˙k3 = −γ1x3 − γ2x3 + σψkxk2Θ1,
(13)
where the coefficients have the known meaning and Θ1
is a function of time that captures the probability that
any given link points to a player in 1. System (13) can
be represented by the Markov chain in Fig. 3.
3
1 2
γ1 γ2
σΘ1
Fig. 3. Markov chain for asymmetric case.
Furthermore we define function Θ1 as:
Θ1 =
∑
k kP (k)x
k
1∑
j jP (j)
=
∑
k kP (k)x
k
1
〈k〉 , (14)
and its first derivative Ψ as:
Θ˙1 =
∑
k kP (k)x˙
k
1
〈k〉 =
∑
k kP (k)γ1x3
〈k〉 := Ψ. (15)
Consider the second derivative of xk2 :
x¨k2 = −σx˙k2Θ1 − σxk2Θ˙1 + γx˙k3 . (16)
The above second-order differential equation corre-
sponds to the following bidimensional first-order system:
[
x˙k2
x¨k2
]
=
[
0 1
−σΨ kkmax −σΘ1 kkmax
][
xk2
x˙k2
]
+
[
γxk3
γx˙k3
]
.
(17)
The above system shares similarities with a mass-spring-
damper, where Θ plays the role of viscous term, while
the eigenvalues determine the amplitude of the oscilla-
tions. Implication of such a mechanical analogy will be
highlighted and discussed further in the section on the
numerical analysis.
7 Uncertain cross-inhibitory coefficient
In this section, we show that stability properties are not
compromised even if the cross-inhibitory coefficient σ is
uncertain and changes with time within a pre-specified
interval. To do this, we first isolate the nonlinearity
related to the cross-inhibitory signal in the feedback
loop and prove absolute stability using the Kalman-
Yakubovich-Popov lemma, see Chapter 10.1 in Khalil
(2002). The feedback scheme used in this section is de-
picted in Fig. 4.
G(s)
ψ(t)
f(y)
−
+
r(t) e(t)
k
y(t)
Fig. 4. Feedback scheme used to isolate the nonlinearity of
the asymmetric (12) and symmetric systems (4).
Now, the system described by the following set of equa-
tions is considered:
x˙1 = (1− x1 − x2)(rx1 + γ)− x2(σx1 + α),
x˙2 = (1− x1 − x2)(rx2 + γ)− x1(σx2 + α).
(18)
In the following assumption we introduce the sector non-
linerarities.
Assumption 1 Let the cross-inhibitory coefficient σ be
in [0, k˜].
We assume, for simplicity, that x1 = x2. Thus, we can
write
x˙ = (1− 2x)(rx + γ)− x(σx + α). (19)
The linearized version of (18) is
[
x˙1
x˙2
]
=

 r − 3rx− γ − α −rx− γ
−rx− γ r − 3rx− γ − α


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
x1
x2
]
.
(20)
Building on the Kalman-Yakubovich-Popov lemma, ab-
solute stability is linked to strictly positive realness of
Z(s) = I + KG(s) where K = k˜11T ∈ R2×2 and G(s)
is the transfer function of system (20), yet to be calcu-
lated. Before addressing absolute stability, we first in-
vestigate conditions under which matrix A is Hurwitz.
To be Hurwitz, the trace of matrix A must be negative,
i.e. Tr(A) = 2(r − 3rx − γ − α) < 0, and the determi-
nant must be positive, i.e. ∆(A) = (r− 3rx− γ −α)2 −
5
(−rx − γ)2 > 0. For the first condition, we can neglect
the multiplier and have
Tr(A) = r − 3rx− γ − α ≤ r(1 − 3/2)− γ − α,
where the equality holds from the condition x1 = x2 =: x
which implies, in turn, that x can be at most 0.5. In the
case where x is sufficiently small, γ and α can be set
sufficiently large to guarantee the condition Tr(A) < 0.
For the condition on the determinant, we have
∆(A) = 3rx+ γ + α− r − rx− γ = 2rx+ α− r > 0,
which is satisfied, when x = 0.5, and is still true by
choosing a properα in all the other cases. Now, we isolate
the nonlinearities in ψ, and we set B = C = I, where
I denotes the identity matrix. Let us now obtain the
transfer function associated with system (20):
G(s) = cT [sI−A]−1b = 1
a2 − b2
[
a −b
−b a
]
, (21)
where a = s+3rx+ γ+α− r and b = rx+ γ. Then, for
Z(s) we obtain
Z(s) = I+KG(s) =

 1 0
0 1

+

 ak−bka2−b2 −bk+aka2−b2
−bk+ak
a2−b2
ak−bk
a2−b2


=

 1 + ka+b ka+b
k
a+b
1 + k
a+b

 = 1
s+ζ

 s+ ζ + k k
k s+ ζ + k

 ,
(22)
where ζ = 4rx + 2γ + α − r. We are ready to establish
the following result.
Theorem 6 Let system (20) be given and assume that
A is Hurwitz. Furthermore, let us consider the sector
nonlinearity as in Assumption 1. Then, Z(s) is strictly
positive real and the system (20) is absolutely stable.
We can extend our robustness analysis to the asymmet-
ric system described by the following set of equations:
x˙1 = γ1(1− x1 − x2),
x˙2 = −σ1x1x2 + γ2(1− x1 − x2).
(23)
System (23) is the asymmetric version of (4), when r
and α are negligible. This system admits two equilib-
rium points, i.e. x∗ = (1, 0), (0, 1). As in the previous
sections, by applying the Lyapunov linearisationmethod
we study the stability of these equilibrium points. For
the equilibrium point x∗ = (1, 0) and x∗ = (0, 1), the
Jacobian matrices are given by
J(1,0) =
[
−γ1 −γ1
−γ2 −γ2 − σ1
]
, J(0,1) =
[
−γ1 −γ1
−γ2 − σ1 −γ2
]
.
For J(1,0) the trace is T = −γ1 − γ2 − σ1 < 0 and the
determinant is ∆ = −γ1(−γ2 − σ1)− γ1γ2 = γ1σ1 > 0,
which means that x∗ = (1, 0) is stable. Analogously, for
J(0,1), the trace is T = −γ1 − γ2 < 0 and the determi-
nant is ∆ = γ1γ2 − γ1(γ2 + σ1) = −γ1σ1 < 0, which
means that x∗ = (0, 1) is a saddle. The corresponding
bidimensional first-order system is
[
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
[
−γ1 −γ1
−γ2 −γ2
][
x1
x2
]
+
[
γ1
γ2
]
−
[
0
σ1
]
x1x2,
y =
[
0 1
] [ x1
x2
]
.
(24)
We denote the matrix of γ1, γ2 as matrixA, the constant
vector [γ1 γ2]
T as k, the vector [0 σ1]
T as b and the
vector [0 1] as cT . Here, we denoteAT for the transpose
of matrix A. For a first approximation, we will not con-
sider vector k. The resulting calculations for the transfer
function are:
G(s) = cT [sI−A]−1b = (s+γ1)σ1s(s+γ1+γ2) . (25)
Now, we check whether the transfer function is positive
real, to ensure stability of system (23). To be positive
real, the following conditions must hold true:
(1) G(s) is stable, i.e. no poles Re{s} > 0.
(2) Re{G(jω)} ≥ 0, i.e. −π/2 ≤ G(jω) ≤ π/2.
Condition (1) is trivially verified, since the real part of
both poles s = 0 and s = −γ1−γ2 is equal to or less than
zero. By inspection, condition (2) can be easily verified
by plotting the imaginary part in the y-axis and the real
part in the x-axis. This is depicted in Fig. 5, where it
can be seen that, for a fixed ω > 0, the condition trans-
lates into α− β− π/2 ≥ −π/2, which is always verified.
Similarly, for a fixed ω < 0, we have the symmetric case
in which −α+ β + π/2 ≤ π/2, which is always verified.
Thus, G(s) is positive real and system (24) is absolutely
stable.
Re{G(jω)}
Im{G(jω)}
γ1 γ1 + γ2α β
ω
Fig. 5. Diagram showing that −π/2 ≤ G(jω) ≤ π/2 in ac-
cordance to condition (2).
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8 Numerical Simulations
In this sectionwe simulate the system in the case of struc-
tured environment, using the Baraba´si-Albert complex
network. We assume that only a few nodes have high
connectivity, whereas a large number of nodes have very
low connectivity. We use a discretized version of the fol-
lowing power-law distribution, see Moreno et al. (2002):
P (k) =
2m2
k3
for k ≥ m, m = 〈k〉/2. (26)
In the rest of the section, we write ki = N% to mean
that players in class ki are connected to N% of the pop-
ulation. The sum of all players of all classes is in accor-
dance with (26), i.e.
∑
i ki = 1, for all i. The complex
network is depicted in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Complex network used for the simulations.
The asymmetric case. In the asymmetric case the
system shares similarities with a mass-spring-damper
model, as formulated in (17). We investigate the role
of the cross-inhibitory signal parameter σ. The plot of
the population distribution is displayed in Figs. 7-8 for
σ = 3 and σ = 15, respectively. The simulations involve
only the population connected to only 5% of the whole
population. Such population amounts to 30% of the to-
tal. As initial state, the population in state 1 is equal to
10% of the total and in state 2 is equal to the rest 90%.
The plots show that a higher value of σ leads to a higher
transient response of the third state component and to
a faster response of the first two state components.
Mean-Field Response. We now simulate the mean-
field response assuming a constant value θ1 = θ2 = 0.4,
for two classes of players, namely those with connectiv-
ity k1 = 22% and k9 = 85%. As for the initial state,
the population is split among the three states as: 60%
in state 1, 20% in both states 2 and 3. From the plots in
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Fig. 7. Trajectories for σ = 3 in barycentric coordinates.
  0.9   0.8   0.7   0.6   0.5   0.4   0.3   0.2   0.1     0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
  0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
  0
x2
x3x1
Fig. 8. Trajectories for σ = 15 in barycentric coordinates.
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Fig. 9. Trajectories for θ1 = θ2 = 0.4 and σ = 3.
Figs. 9-10, it is evident that the class with higher con-
nectivity converges to an equilibrium point with higher
values of x3 (the uncommitted state). Theorem 4 justi-
fies this behaviour, i.e. the role of parameter ψk.
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Fig. 10. Trajectories for θ1 = θ2 = 0.4 and σ = 15.
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Fig. 11. Time evolution of micro-macro model σ = 5.
Micro-macro model. The last set of simulations in-
volves the micro-macro model in (7) and (10). The
classes are identical to the previous set, while as for the
initial state, the population is split among the three
states as: 70% in state 1 and 30% in state 2. The plots
in Fig. 11 show that at the equilibrium the value of
x3 increases with the connectivity, when σ is constant,
namely we have more players in the uncommitted state.
Again, this is in accordance to theorem 4.
9 Conclusion
For a collective decision making process originating in
the context of honeybees swarms, we have provided an
evolutionary game interpretation and we have studied
stability in the case of structured and unstructured en-
vironment. Furthermore, we have investigated the role
of the connectivity in terms of speed of convergence
and characterisation of the equilibrium point. Finally,
we have analysed the system in case of uncertain cross-
inhibitory signal, which generalizes the constant coeffi-
cient used in the previous studies.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. To study equilibrium points, we
first impose x˙1 = x˙2 = 0 and obtain (x3r−α)(x1−x2) =
0, which leads to two solutions: x1 = x2 and x3 = α/r,
both studied in the first two cases, while the third case
analyses the scenario in which both hold true.
[Case 1] When x1 = x2 = x, the equilibrium point is
the root of a second degree polynomial, x˙ = (2r+σ)x2−
8

 θ˙1
θ˙2

 =


r
kmax
(V (k)/〈k〉 −Ψ1 −Ψ2)− α− γ −
σ
kmax
Ψ1 − γ
− σ
kmax
Ψ2 − γ
r
kmax
(V (k)/〈k〉 −Ψ1 −Ψ2)− α− γ



 θ1
θ2

+

 γ
γ

 .
Table 1
System (10) in matrix form.
(r−2γ−α)x−γ = 0. From x˙1 = 0 and x∗1+x∗2+x∗3 = 1,
we have the following equilibrium point, the roots of the
above polynomial are given by:
x∗1 =
(r−2γ−α)+
√
(r−2γ−α)2+4γ(2r+σ)
2(2r+σ) = x
∗
2,
x∗3 = 1− (r−2γ−α)+
√
(r−2γ−α)2+4γ(2r+σ)
2(2r+σ) .
[Case 2] When x3 = α/r, setting x˙1 = 0 and replacing
x3 = α/r in (4), we obtain x˙1 = αx1+
α
r γ−αx1+σx1−
σx21− αr σx1 = 0, which in turn implies x21− (1− αr )x1−αγ
rσ = 0. From the roots of the above polynomial, the
two equilibrium points are:
x∗1 =
1−α
r
±
√
(1−α
r
)2+ 4αγ
σr
2 ,
x∗2 = 1− 1−
α
r
±
√
(1−α
r
)2+ 4αγ
σr
2 − αr , x∗3 = αr .
(27)
[Case 3] A special case is when x3 = α/r and x1 = x2.
x˙ = αr (rx+γ)−x(α+σx) = αx+ γαr −αx−σx2 = σx2−
γα
r = 0. Since x1 = x2, this leads to: x1 = x2 =
√
αγ
rσ ,
which is equivalent to: x1 =
1−α/r
2 =
r−α
2r . From the
previous equations, we obtain the following value for σ:
(r − α)2
4r2
=
αγ
rσ
⇒ σ = 4rαγ
(r − α)2 . (28)
Thus we have the equilibrium point
x∗ =
(√
αγ
rσ ,
√
αγ
rσ ,
α
r
)
=
(
r−α
2r ,
r−α
2r ,
α
r
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2. From x3 = 1 − x1 − x2, let us
rewrite (4) as
{
x˙1 = (1− x1 − x2)(rx1 + γ)− x1(α+ σx2),
x˙2 = (1− x1 − x2)(rx2 + γ)− x2(α+ σx1).
(29)
To analyse the stability of system (29), we compute the
Jacobian matrix around an equilibrium point, i.e. x :=
x1 = x2, as[
r − 3rx− γ − α− σx x(−r − σ)− γ
x(−r − σ) − γ r − 3rx− γ − α− σx
]
, (30)
for which we have a saddle point when the following
condition for the determinant ∆ of the Jacobian holds:
∆ := J11J22−J12J21 = J211−J212 < 0. The latter is true
when x(r+σ)+γ > 3rx+γ+α+σx− r, which in turn
implies −2rx > α− r. The latter yields x < r−α2r . From
considering x =
√
αγ
rσ for the equilibrium in Case 3, it
follows
σ >
4rαγ
(r − α)2 . (31)
This concludes our proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. The determinant ∆ of the above
matrix is always positive. To see this, note that (r +
σ)ψkθ + α+ γ ≥ ψkrθ + γ. Also, the trace of the above
matrix is negative, i.e., T = −2(r+σ)ψkθ−2α−2γ < 0,
and therefore the system is asymptotically stable. From
T 2 − 4∆ = 4(ψkrθ + γ)2 > 0 we can conclude that the
equilibrium point is an asymptotically stable node.
As for the speed of convergence, let us focus on the eigen-
values of the Jacobian. To this purpose, let us calculate
the determinant which is given by
∆ = [−(σ + r)ψkθ − α− γ]2 − [−ψkrθ − γ]2
= σ2ψ2kθ
2 + α2 − 2[rσψ2kθ2 − rαψkθ − σαψkθ − σγψk − αγ]
= (σ2 − 2rσ)ψ2kθ2 + (2rα + 2σα+ 2σγ)ψkθ + α2 + 2αγ.
Then, T 2− 4∆ = 4[ψkrθ+ γ]2. Thus, the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix are λ1,2 = −(σ + r)ψkθ − α− γ ±
(ψkrθ + γ). In the two extreme case of no connectivity
ψk = 0 and full connectivity ψk = 1.
λ1,2 =
{
(−α− 2γ,−α), for ψk = 0,
(−(2r + σ)θ − α− 2γ,−σθ − α), for ψk = 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. We can compute the following
x∗k = A
−1
k (θ)ck(θ)
= 1−(2r+σ)ψkθ−α−2γ [−ψkrθ − γ − ψkrθ − γ]T
= 1(2r+σ)ψkθ+α+2γ [ψkrθ + γ ψkrθ + γ]
T .
(32)
Again, when considering the above two cases we get
x∗k =
1
α+2γ [γ γ]
T ψk = 0,
x∗k =
1
(2r+σ)θ+α+2γ [rθ + γ rθ + γ]
T ψk = 1.
(33)
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Therefore, we can also say that higher connectivity in-
creases the number of players in the uncommitted state.
Proof of Theorem 5. To compute the equilibrium, let
us set θ˙1 = θ˙2 and obtain:
(
θ1−θ2
)( r
kmax
Ψ3−α
)
+
σθ1
kmax
Ψ2− σθ2
kmax
Ψ1 = 0. (34)
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium where θ1 = θ2, we
can neglect the last two terms. We can then compute the
Jacobian of system (10) and obtain the matrix in Table
1.
To inspect the existence of saddle points we need to study
conditions under which the determinant of the Jacobian
is less than 0. Then, we take Ψ1 = Ψ2 and impose that
the right-hand side is greater than the left-hand side
(
− σ
kmax
Ψ− γ
)2
>
( r
kmax
(V (k)/〈k〉 − 2Ψ)−α− γ
)2
.
By taking the square root on both sides, since the
left-hand side is strictly negative, we have − σkmaxΨ <
−2 rkmaxΨ +
rV (k)
kmax〈k〉
− α, and after some basic algebra,
we get (11).
Proof of theorem 6. Let us first prove that Z(s) is
strictly positive real. Thus, we study the properties of
matrix Z(s), specifically the positive realness. To be
strictly positive real, the following conditions must hold
true:
• Z(s) is Hurwitz, i.e poles of all elements of Z(s) have
negative real parts;
• Z(jω) + Z(−jω) > 0, ∀ω ∈ R;
• Z(∞) + ZT (∞) > 0.
First, we prove that Z(s) is Hurwitz. Thus, all the poles
must be negative, i.e. r− 4rx− 2γ−α < 0. which holds
true, after considering the discussion on the trace of ma-
trixA as a direct consequence. Now, we check the second
condition. It follows that
Z(jω) + Z(−jω) = 1
jω+ζ

 jω + ζ + k k
k jω + ζ + k


+ 1
−jω+ζ

−jω + ζ + k k
k −jω + ζ + k

 =

 jω+ζ+kjω+ζ kjω+ζ
k
jω+ζ
jω+ζ+k
jω+ζ


+

 −jω+ζ+k−jω+ζ k−jω+ζ
k
−jω+ζ
−jω+ζ+k
−jω+ζ

 =

 z11 z12
z21 z22

 ,
where
z11 = z22 =
ω2−jωζ−jωk+jωζ+ζ2+ζk+ω2+jωζ+jωk−jωζ+ζ2+ζk
ζ2+ω2
and z12 = z21 =
−jωk+ζ+k+jωk+ζk
ζ2+ω2 . Thus, the second
condition can be rewritten as
Z(jω) + Z(−jω) =


2ω2+2ζ2+2ζk
ζ2+ω2
2ζ+k
ζ2+ω2
2ζ+k
ζ2+ω2
2ω2+2ζ2+2ζk
ζ2+ω2

 > 0,
which is verified for all ω. Last, as Z(s) is symmetric the
third condition implies that 2Z(∞) > 0 . Note that the
off-diagonal entries converge to zero in the limit, while
entries on themain diagonal converge to 1 in the limit. So
we have an identity matrix, and thus the third condition
is verified. Let us turn to prove absolute stability by
showing that there exists a Lyapunov function V (x) =
xTPx. Let us derive the expression of V˙ (t, x) as
V˙ (t, x) = x˙TPx+ xTPx
= xTATPx+ xTPAx− ψTBTPx− xTPBψ,
(35)
whereψ is equivalent of writing ψ(t, y). For the condition
on the sector nonlinearity −2ψT (ψ−Ky) ≥ 0 and from
matrices P andK being symmetric, we can now special-
ize it to our case, i.e. A symmetric and B = C = I, as
V˙ (t, x) ≤ xT (ATP + PA)x− 2xTPBψ − 2ψT (ψ −Ky)
= 2xTAPx− 2xTPψ + 2ψTKx− 2ψTψ
= 2xTAPx+ 2xT (K − P )ψ − 2ψTψ.
(36)
We can rewrite this in matrix form as
V˙ (t, x) ≤ 2xT
[
a b
b a
][
p1 p2
p2 p1
]
x+ 2xT
([
k˜ k˜
k˜ k˜
]
−
[
p1 p2
p2 p1
])
x− 2ψTψ,
(37)
where a = r−3rx−γ−α and b = −rx−γ. To show that
the right-hand side of (36) is negative, we can construct
a square term by imposing
2AP = −LTL− ǫP,
K − P = √2LT ,
(38)
where ǫ > 0 is a constant and matrix P = PT > 0. Now,
we can rewrite (36) as
V˙ (t, x) ≤ −ǫxTPx− xTLTLx+ 2√2xTLTψ − 2ψTψ
= −ǫxTPx− [Lx−√2ψ]T [Lx−√2ψ]
≤ −ǫxTPx.
(39)
From Kalman-Yakubovich-Popov lemma, we can obtain
P , L, ǫ solving (38), as Z(s) is positive real. This con-
cludes our proof.
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